Organization: Patriots Forever
Reply-To:
Lines: 255
X-Postfilter: 1.3.38
It`s not really surprising, to those who know history
and are free to contemplate it, that the "Heir to the
Holocaust" likes his concentration camps.
On Wed, 16 Apr 2008 19:47:09 -0400, Thaddeus Stevens
> US Detention of Iraqis Grows Without End By Christopher Kuttruff
> t r u t h o u t | Report Wednesday 20 February 2008
>
>http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/022008S.shtml
>
> The United States is, once again, expanding the size of its largest detention center in
>Iraq. According to an October 31 report by the military paper Stars and Stripes, US forces will
>be increasing the capacity of detainees at Camp Bucca from 20,000 to 30,000. (1)
>
> An ever-increasing prison population has put extreme pressure on detainment facilities
>as well as on Iraq`s fragile, developing judicial system. The New York Times reported on
>February 14 that more than half of the 26,000 detainees in US custody are still awaiting trial -
>many having been imprisoned for years. (2)
>
> For example, Bilal Hussein, a photographer from The Associated Press, has been detained
>by the US military since April of 2006, while no evidence or charges have been brought forward
>against him in court. (3)
>
> Bilal Hussein is one of many individuals urgently seeking a just and expedient manner
>to challenge their detainment.
>
> Most of the prisoners held by the Iraqi and American governments are Sunni Arabs,
>accused of fueling the insurgency. (4) This sectarian imbalance has created controversy, with
>many Iraqis in the Sunni minority accusing Iraqi and American forces of foul play.
>
> These individuals often reference the precedent set at the detention centers at Bagram
>Air Base in Afghanistan as well as at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
>
> Filmmaker Alex Gibney explores these abuses in his new documentary, "Taxi to the Dark
>Side." While much of his film examines the mistreatment of prisoners at locations such as Bagram
>and Guantanamo, Gibney also focuses on the process by which these individuals are often taken
>into custody. One such US policy involves offering financial compensation to Afghani warlords
>and Pakistani forces for the capture of Iraqi "insurgents." Gibney notes that these bounties
>accounted for 93 percent of the population at Guantanamo. (5)
>
> These detainees have encountered what many civil rights groups have deemed brutal and
>inhumane conditions.
>
> In 2002, US officials deported Canadian Maher Arar to Syria, where he was subsequently
>tortured. According to a 2006 report, Mr. Arar, after being interrogated by US officials, was
>extradited to a Syrian facility where he "was questioned for 16 to 18 hours, and was subjected
>to great physical and psychological abuse.... Mr. Arar was beaten with [a] black cable on a
>number of occasions throughout the day, and was threatened with electric shock...." (6) Maher
>Arar later tried to challenge his rendition and sue then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, but the
>US government dismissed his case, citing a rarely-invoked state secrets privilege.
>
> Denied proper trial, prisoners at Guantanamo are processed by Combatant Status Review
>Tribunals, where evidence remains private and inaccessible to defendants.
>
> Feeling they have no other recourse, detainees have frequently resorted to drastic
>measures such as hunger strikes. (7) and (8) According to The Washington Post, as many as 128
>prisoners took part in such protests at one point in 2005, with many more following suit since then.
>
> John Pace, former UN human rights chief for Iraq, stated in 2005 that the US was
>"abusing its mandate in Iraq." One of Mr. Pace`s key complaints regarded the treatment of
>detainees. (9)
>
> "There is no question that terrorism has to be addressed. But we are equally sure that
>the remedies being applied are not the best way of eliminating terrorism," Pace said. "More
>terrorists are being created than are being eliminated."
>
> While the US has certain authorities for managing security in Iraq under United Nations
>Security Council Resolutions, the Bush administration has continually sought to push the bounds
>of US authority in Iraq. Most recently, as reported by The New York Times, the Bush
>administration is pressing to replace the UN mandate with a direct military agreement with Iraq.
>The agreement would continue a controversial policy of protection of private contractors from
>Iraqi local law, as well as US authority for detainment. (10)
>
> The latest UN resolution for the authorization of multinational forces (MNF) in Iraq
>(Resolution 1790), however, was met with substantial resistance by Iraqi lawmakers. In April
>2007, the majority of the Iraqi parliament signed a letter written to the UN demanding a
>timetable for withdrawal of MNF - composed primarily of US forces. The letter referred to these
>forces as "occupation forces." (11)
>
> Such stern language was followed by a June 5 law signed by the majority of the
>parliament, demanding legislative approval of any future UN MNF renewal. (12)
>
> But despite mounting dissent, Nouri al-Maliki rushed the MNF renewal through the UN,
>authorizing the presence of multinational forces, ignoring the majority of the legislature and
>population of Iraq and allowing the perpetuation of security and detainment policies of the Bush
>administration. (13)
>
> ----------
>
> Christopher Kuttruff is a frequent contributor to Truthout.org.
>
> ----------
>
> (1)http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=57437&archive=true
>
> (2)http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/world/middleeast/14justice.html
>
> (3)http://www.ap.org/bilalhussein/
>
> (4)http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L08786699.htm
>
> (5)"Taxi to the Dark Side," directed by Alex Gibney
>
> (6)http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf
>
> (7)http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/12/AR2005091201690.html
>
> (8)http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/08/news/gitmo.php
>
>
>(9)http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/america-abusing-mandate-in-iraq/2005/12/05/1133631201911.html
>
>
>(10)http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/25/world/middleeast/25military.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=login
>
>
>(11)http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2007/042007unletterenglish.pdf
>
> (12)http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/unrole/2007/1105legalrenewal.htm
>
> (13)http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/51624/
>
> ________________________________________________________________
>
>
>A reasonably just and well-ordered democratic society might be possible, and . . . justice as
>fairness should have a special place among the political conceptions in its political and social
>world. . . [M]any are prepared to accept the conclusion that a just and well-ordered democratic
>society is not possible, and even regard it as obvious. Isn`t admitting it part of growing up,
>part of the inevitable loss of innocence? But is this conclusion one we can so easily accept?
> The answer we give to the question of whether a just democratic society is possible and
>can be stable for the right reasons affects our background thoughts and attitudes about the
>world as a whole. And it affects these thoughts and attitudes before we come to actual politics,
>and limits or inspires how we take part in it. . .
> If we take for granted as common knowledge that a just and well-ordered democratic society
>is impossible, then the quality and tone of those attitudes will reflect that knowledge. A cause
>of the fall of Wiemar`s constitutional regime was that none of the traditional elites of Germany
>supported its constitution or were willing to cooperate to make it work. They no longer
>believed a decent liberal parliamentary regime was possible. Its time had past.
>
>The regime fell first to a series of authoritarian cabinet governments from 1930 to 1932. When
>these were increasingly weakened by their lack of popular support, President Hindenburg was
>finally persuaded to turn to Hitler, who had such support and whom conservatives thought they
>could control.
>~ John Rawls "Political Liberalism" pg. lx
>
> * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
>____________________________________________________________________________________
> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
>
>Finally, the campaigns of 1793 and 1794 set Clausewitz on the path of recognizing war as a
>political phenomenon. Wars, as everyone knew, were fought for a purpose that was political, or
>at least always had political consequences. Not as readily apparent was the implication that
>followed. If war was meant to achieve a political purpose, everything that entered into war —
>social and economic preparation, strategic planning, the conduct of operations, the use of
>violence on all levels — should be determined by this purpose, or at least accord with it. Even
>though soldiers had to acquire special expertise, and function in what in some respects was a
>separate world, it would be a denial of reality to allow them to carry on their bloody work
>undisturbed until an armistice brought their political employer back into the equation. Just as
>war and its institutions reflected their social environment, so every aspect of fighting should
>be suffused by its political impulse, whether this impulse was intense or moderate. The
>appropriate relationship between politics and war occupied Clausewitz throughout his life, but
>even his earliest manuscripts and letters show his awareness of their interaction.
> The ease with which this link — always acknowledged in the abstract — can be forgotten in
>specific cases, and Clausewitz’s insistence that it must never be overlooked, are illustrated by
>his polite rejection toward the end of his life of a strategic problem set by the chief of the
>Prussian General Staff, in which every military detail of the opposing sides was spelled out,
>but no mention made of their political purpose. To a friend who had sent him the problem for
>comment, Clausewitz replied that it was not possible to draft a sensible plan of operations
>without indicating the political condition of the states involved, and their relationship to
>each other: ‘War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different
>means. Consequently, the main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in
>nature, and their political character increases the more the plan applies to the entire campaign
>and to the whole state. A war plan results directly from the political conditions of the two
>warring states, as well as from their relations to third powers. A plan of campaign results from
>the war plan, and frequently - if there is only one theater of operations - may even be
>identical with it. But the political element even enters the separate components of a campaign;
>rarely will it be without influence on such major episodes of warfare as a battle, etc.
>According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a
>great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.’
>
>Everyman’s Library, 1993 ISBN: 0679420436 On war /by Clausewitz, Carl von, 1780-1831.
>Knopf, 1993. From the introduction by Peter Paret, Pg7
>_____________________________________________________________________
>
>The U-2 is a jet-powered reconnaissance aircraft specially designed to fly at high altitudes
>(i.e., above 70,000 ft [21 km]). It was used during the late 1950s to overfly the Soviet Union,
>China, the Middle East, and Cuba; flights over the Soviet Union, the primary mission for which
>the plane was designed, ended in 1960 when a U-2 flown by CIA pilot Gary Powers was shot down
>over the Soviet Union. This event was a major political embarrassment for the U.S.
>http://www.espionageinfo.com/Te-Uk/U-2-Spy-Plane.html
>
> Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev`s reaction to the overflights which were discovered
>just before a summit conference in Paris with President Eisenhower: "It was as though the
>Americans had deliberately tried to place a time bomb under the meeting" . . ."How could they
>count on us to give them a helping hand if we allowed ourselves to be spat upon without so much
>as a murmur of protest?" The only solution was to demand a formal public apology from Eisenhower
>and a guarantee that no more overflights would take place . . .
> But the apology Khrushchev was looking for would not come. Despite having trespassed on
>the Soviet Union for the past four years with scores of flights by both U-2`s and heavy bombers,
>the old general still could not say the words, it was just not in him. . . A time bomb had
>exploded, prematurely ending the summit conference. . .
> Back in Washington, the mood was glum. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was leaning
>toward holding a closed door investigation into the U-2 incident . . . In public, Eisenhower
>maintained a brave face. He "heartily approved" of the congressional probe and would `of course
>fully cooperate,` he quickly told anyone who asked. But in private he was very troubled. For
>weeks he had tried to head off the investigation. His major concern was that his own personal
>involvement in the overflights would surface, especially the May Day disaster. Equally, he was
>very worried that details of the dangerous bomber overflights would leak out. The massed
>overflight may in fact, have been one of the most dangerous actions ever approved by a president.
> pg. 51-55 ~Body of Secrets; Anatomy of the Ultra Secret National Security Agency
> James Bamford
>-------
>---------------------------
>____________________________________________________________________
>
>"Let me give you a word of the philosophy of reform. The whole history of the progress of human
>liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her august claims, have been born of earnest
>struggle. The conflict has been exciting, agitating, all-absorbing, and for the time being,
>putting all other tumults to silence. It must do this or it does nothing. If there is no
>struggle there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet depreciate agitation,
>are men who want crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without thunder and
>lightening. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters."
>
>
>"This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be both moral and
>physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and
>it never will. Find out just what any people will quietly submit to and you have found out the
>exact measure of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them, and these will continue
>till they are resisted with either words or blows, or with both. The limits of tyrants are
>prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress. In the light of these ideas, Negroes
>will be hunted at the North, and held and flogged at the South so long as they submit to those
>devilish outrages, and make no resistance, either moral or physical. Men may not get all they
>pay for in this world; but they must certainly pay for all they get. If we ever get free from
>the oppressions and wrongs heaped upon us, we must pay for their removal. We must do this by
>labor, by suffering, by sacrifice, and if needs be, by our lives and the lives of others."
>http://www.buildingequality.us/Quotes/Frederick_Douglass.htm
>Frederick Douglass, 1857
>- - - - - -> More political discussion continues at
>http://www.politicsusaweb.com/
>
> This post contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically
>authorized by the copyright owner. I am making such material available in my efforts to advance
>understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and
>social justice issues, etc. I believe this constitutes a `fair use` of any such copyrighted
>material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17
>U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have
>expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational
>purposes.
> For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish
>to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond `fair use`,
>you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
>
SUBJECT: Re: ! ! America as fascist state: US Detention of Iraqis Grows Without End ! !
GO >>>
From: * US *
Subject: Re: ! ! America as fascist state: US Detention of Iraqis Grows Without End ! !
Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2008 15:31:49 -0400
Sender: * US *
Organization: Patriots Forever
Reply-To:
Lines: 256
X-Postfilter: 1.3.38
It`s not really surprising, to those who know history
and are free to contemplate it, that the "Heir to the
Holocaust" likes his concentration camps.
He seriously dislikes freedom.
On Wed, 16 Apr 2008 19:47:09 -0400, Thaddeus Stevens wrote:
> US Detention of Iraqis Grows Without End By Christopher Kuttruff
> t r u t h o u t | Report Wednesday 20 February 2008
>
>http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/022008S.shtml
>
> The United States is, once again, expanding the size of its largest detention center in
>Iraq. According to an October 31 report by the military paper Stars and Stripes, US forces will
>be increasing the capacity of detainees at Camp Bucca from 20,000 to 30,000. (1)
>
> An ever-increasing prison population has put extreme pressure on detainment facilities
>as well as on Iraq`s fragile, developing judicial system. The New York Times reported on
>February 14 that more than half of the 26,000 detainees in US custody are still awaiting trial -
>many having been imprisoned for years. (2)
>
> For example, Bilal Hussein, a photographer from The Associated Press, has been detained
>by the US military since April of 2006, while no evidence or charges have been brought forward
>against him in court. (3)
>
> Bilal Hussein is one of many individuals urgently seeking a just and expedient manner
>to challenge their detainment.
>
> Most of the prisoners held by the Iraqi and American governments are Sunni Arabs,
>accused of fueling the insurgency. (4) This sectarian imbalance has created controversy, with
>many Iraqis in the Sunni minority accusing Iraqi and American forces of foul play.
>
> These individuals often reference the precedent set at the detention centers at Bagram
>Air Base in Afghanistan as well as at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
>
> Filmmaker Alex Gibney explores these abuses in his new documentary, "Taxi to the Dark
>Side." While much of his film examines the mistreatment of prisoners at locations such as Bagram
>and Guantanamo, Gibney also focuses on the process by which these individuals are often taken
>into custody. One such US policy involves offering financial compensation to Afghani warlords
>and Pakistani forces for the capture of Iraqi "insurgents." Gibney notes that these bounties
>accounted for 93 percent of the population at Guantanamo. (5)
>
> These detainees have encountered what many civil rights groups have deemed brutal and
>inhumane conditions.
>
> In 2002, US officials deported Canadian Maher Arar to Syria, where he was subsequently
>tortured. According to a 2006 report, Mr. Arar, after being interrogated by US officials, was
>extradited to a Syrian facility where he "was questioned for 16 to 18 hours, and was subjected
>to great physical and psychological abuse.... Mr. Arar was beaten with [a] black cable on a
>number of occasions throughout the day, and was threatened with electric shock...." (6) Maher
>Arar later tried to challenge his rendition and sue then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, but the
>US government dismissed his case, citing a rarely-invoked state secrets privilege.
>
> Denied proper trial, prisoners at Guantanamo are processed by Combatant Status Review
>Tribunals, where evidence remains private and inaccessible to defendants.
>
> Feeling they have no other recourse, detainees have frequently resorted to drastic
>measures such as hunger strikes. (7) and (8) According to The Washington Post, as many as 128
>prisoners took part in such protests at one point in 2005, with many more following suit since then.
>
> John Pace, former UN human rights chief for Iraq, stated in 2005 that the US was
>"abusing its mandate in Iraq." One of Mr. Pace`s key complaints regarded the treatment of
>detainees. (9)
>
> "There is no question that terrorism has to be addressed. But we are equally sure that
>the remedies being applied are not the best way of eliminating terrorism," Pace said. "More
>terrorists are being created than are being eliminated."
>
> While the US has certain authorities for managing security in Iraq under United Nations
>Security Council Resolutions, the Bush administration has continually sought to push the bounds
>of US authority in Iraq. Most recently, as reported by The New York Times, the Bush
>administration is pressing to replace the UN mandate with a direct military agreement with Iraq.
>The agreement would continue a controversial policy of protection of private contractors from
>Iraqi local law, as well as US authority for detainment. (10)
>
> The latest UN resolution for the authorization of multinational forces (MNF) in Iraq
>(Resolution 1790), however, was met with substantial resistance by Iraqi lawmakers. In April
>2007, the majority of the Iraqi parliament signed a letter written to the UN demanding a
>timetable for withdrawal of MNF - composed primarily of US forces. The letter referred to these
>forces as "occupation forces." (11)
>
> Such stern language was followed by a June 5 law signed by the majority of the
>parliament, demanding legislative approval of any future UN MNF renewal. (12)
>
> But despite mounting dissent, Nouri al-Maliki rushed the MNF renewal through the UN,
>authorizing the presence of multinational forces, ignoring the majority of the legislature and
>population of Iraq and allowing the perpetuation of security and detainment policies of the Bush
>administration. (13)
>
> ----------
>
> Christopher Kuttruff is a frequent contributor to Truthout.org.
>
> ----------
>
> (1)http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=57437&archive=true
>
> (2)http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/world/middleeast/14justice.html
>
> (3)http://www.ap.org/bilalhussein/
>
> (4)http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L08786699.htm
>
> (5)"Taxi to the Dark Side," directed by Alex Gibney
>
> (6)http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf
>
> (7)http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/12/AR2005091201690.html
>
> (8)http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/08/news/gitmo.php
>
>
>(9)http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/america-abusing-mandate-in-iraq/2005/12/05/1133631201911.html
>
>
>(10)http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/25/world/middleeast/25military.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=login
>
>
>(11)http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2007/042007unletterenglish.pdf
>
> (12)http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/unrole/2007/1105legalrenewal.htm
>
> (13)http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/51624/
>
> ________________________________________________________________
>
>
>A reasonably just and well-ordered democratic society might be possible, and . . . justice as
>fairness should have a special place among the political conceptions in its political and social
>world. . . [M]any are prepared to accept the conclusion that a just and well-ordered democratic
>society is not possible, and even regard it as obvious. Isn`t admitting it part of growing up,
>part of the inevitable loss of innocence? But is this conclusion one we can so easily accept?
> The answer we give to the question of whether a just democratic society is possible and
>can be stable for the right reasons affects our background thoughts and attitudes about the
>world as a whole. And it affects these thoughts and attitudes before we come to actual politics,
>and limits or inspires how we take part in it. . .
> If we take for granted as common knowledge that a just and well-ordered democratic society
>is impossible, then the quality and tone of those attitudes will reflect that knowledge. A cause
>of the fall of Wiemar`s constitutional regime was that none of the traditional elites of Germany
>supported its constitution or were willing to cooperate to make it work. They no longer
>believed a decent liberal parliamentary regime was possible. Its time had past.
>
>The regime fell first to a series of authoritarian cabinet governments from 1930 to 1932. When
>these were increasingly weakened by their lack of popular support, President Hindenburg was
>finally persuaded to turn to Hitler, who had such support and whom conservatives thought they
>could control.
>~ John Rawls "Political Liberalism" pg. lx
>
> * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
>____________________________________________________________________________________
> + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
>
>Finally, the campaigns of 1793 and 1794 set Clausewitz on the path of recognizing war as a
>political phenomenon. Wars, as everyone knew, were fought for a purpose that was political, or
>at least always had political consequences. Not as readily apparent was the implication that
>followed. If war was meant to achieve a political purpose, everything that entered into war —
>social and economic preparation, strategic planning, the conduct of operations, the use of
>violence on all levels — should be determined by this purpose, or at least accord with it. Even
>though soldiers had to acquire special expertise, and function in what in some respects was a
>separate world, it would be a denial of reality to allow them to carry on their bloody work
>undisturbed until an armistice brought their political employer back into the equation. Just as
>war and its institutions reflected their social environment, so every aspect of fighting should
>be suffused by its political impulse, whether this impulse was intense or moderate. The
>appropriate relationship between politics and war occupied Clausewitz throughout his life, but
>even his earliest manuscripts and letters show his awareness of their interaction.
> The ease with which this link — always acknowledged in the abstract — can be forgotten in
>specific cases, and Clausewitz’s insistence that it must never be overlooked, are illustrated by
>his polite rejection toward the end of his life of a strategic problem set by the chief of the
>Prussian General Staff, in which every military detail of the opposing sides was spelled out,
>but no mention made of their political purpose. To a friend who had sent him the problem for
>comment, Clausewitz replied that it was not possible to draft a sensible plan of operations
>without indicating the political condition of the states involved, and their relationship to
>each other: ‘War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different
>means. Consequently, the main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in
>nature, and their political character increases the more the plan applies to the entire campaign
>and to the whole state. A war plan results directly from the political conditions of the two
>warring states, as well as from their relations to third powers. A plan of campaign results from
>the war plan, and frequently - if there is only one theater of operations - may even be
>identical with it. But the political element even enters the separate components of a campaign;
>rarely will it be without influence on such major episodes of warfare as a battle, etc.
>According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a
>great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.’
>
>Everyman’s Library, 1993 ISBN: 0679420436 On war /by Clausewitz, Carl von, 1780-1831.
>Knopf, 1993. From the introduction by Peter Paret, Pg7
>_____________________________________________________________________
>
>The U-2 is a jet-powered reconnaissance aircraft specially designed to fly at high altitudes
>(i.e., above 70,000 ft [21 km]). It was used during the late 1950s to overfly the Soviet Union,
>China, the Middle East, and Cuba; flights over the Soviet Union, the primary mission for which
>the plane was designed, ended in 1960 when a U-2 flown by CIA pilot Gary Powers was shot down
>over the Soviet Union. This event was a major political embarrassment for the U.S.
>http://www.espionageinfo.com/Te-Uk/U-2-Spy-Plane.html
>
> Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev`s reaction to the overflights which were discovered
>just before a summit conference in Paris with President Eisenhower: "It was as though the
>Americans had deliberately tried to place a time bomb under the meeting" . . ."How could they
>count on us to give them a helping hand if we allowed ourselves to be spat upon without so much
>as a murmur of protest?" The only solution was to demand a formal public apology from Eisenhower
>and a guarantee that no more overflights would take place . . .
> But the apology Khrushchev was looking for would not come. Despite having trespassed on
>the Soviet Union for the past four years with scores of flights by both U-2`s and heavy bombers,
>the old general still could not say the words, it was just not in him. . . A time bomb had
>exploded, prematurely ending the summit conference. . .
> Back in Washington, the mood was glum. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was leaning
>toward holding a closed door investigation into the U-2 incident . . . In public, Eisenhower
>maintained a brave face. He "heartily approved" of the congressional probe and would `of course
>fully cooperate,` he quickly told anyone who asked. But in private he was very troubled. For
>weeks he had tried to head off the investigation. His major concern was that his own personal
>involvement in the overflights would surface, especially the May Day disaster. Equally, he was
>very worried that details of the dangerous bomber overflights would leak out. The massed
>overflight may in fact, have been one of the most dangerous actions ever approved by a president.
> pg. 51-55 ~Body of Secrets; Anatomy of the Ultra Secret National Security Agency
> James Bamford
>-------
>---------------------------
>____________________________________________________________________
>
>"Let me give you a word of the philosophy of reform. The whole history of the progress of human
>liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her august claims, have been born of earnest
>struggle. The conflict has been exciting, agitating, all-absorbing, and for the time being,
>putting all other tumults to silence. It must do this or it does nothing. If there is no
>struggle there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet depreciate agitation,
>are men who want crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without thunder and
>lightening. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters."
>
>
>"This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be both moral and
>physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and
>it never will. Find out just what any people will quietly submit to and you have found out the
>exact measure of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them, and these will continue
>till they are resisted with either words or blows, or with both. The limits of tyrants are
>prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress. In the light of these ideas, Negroes
>will be hunted at the North, and held and flogged at the South so long as they submit to those
>devilish outrages, and make no resistance, either moral or physical. Men may not get all they
>pay for in this world; but they must certainly pay for all they get. If we ever get free from
>the oppressions and wrongs heaped upon us, we must pay for their removal. We must do this by
>labor, by suffering, by sacrifice, and if needs be, by our lives and the lives of others."
>http://www.buildingequality.us/Quotes/Frederick_Douglass.htm
>Frederick Douglass, 1857
>- - - - - -> More political discussion continues at
>http://www.politicsusaweb.com/
>
> This post contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically
>authorized by the copyright owner. I am making such material available in my efforts to advance
>understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and
>social justice issues, etc. I believe this constitutes a `fair use` of any such copyrighted
>material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17
>U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have
>expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational
>purposes.
> For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish
>to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond `fair use`,
>you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
SUBJECT: Re: !! Architects ad Engineers expose cover-up and request new 9-11
GO >>>
From: "S`mee"
Subject: Re: !! Architects ad Engineers expose cover-up and request new 9-11
investigation !!
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2008 20:22:11 -0700 (PDT)
Organization: http://groups.google.com
Lines: 19
On Mar 27, 1:33=A0pm, Henry wrote:
Nut jobs.
I note there are FEW if any qualified demolition experts or engineers
involved...
Ask the guys who knock big buildings down instead of sitting around
mentally masturbating and coming to the wrong conclusion. All I have
ever seen from these intelligent people is smart people coming ot the
wrong conclusion adn lots of assumption on there parts. NONE of the
steel exploded none of their conclusions are right.
Heck, come on over this summer Henry and I`ll SHOW you that steel can
be bent, distorted at temps lower than when the JP4 put the girders in
the tower to. You know my hotmail addy. I`d love to have you over swap
a few beers and have fun. Even if you do hate my guts.
--
Keith S
SUBJECT: Re: !! Architects ad Engineers expose cover-up and request new 9-11
GO >>>
From: "S`mee"
Subject: Re: !! Architects ad Engineers expose cover-up and request new 9-11
investigation !!
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2008 16:04:53 -0700 (PDT)
Organization: http://groups.google.com
Lines: 21
On Mar 29, 6:51=A0am, Henry wrote:
SNIP
I`ll glady tell everyone of them face to face they are full of SHIT
and haven`t a CLUE about which they speak. Their math is wrong, the
logistics are not only wrong but untenable AND let`s face it the
current crop of civil servents and administration hacks aren`t capable
of carrying off somthing on that scale with any effectiveness without
the dirty little details coming out.
OBTW you going to come by this summer? Ask those who know I`ll be more
than civil AND I know where the best burgers in the state are made.
Heck I`d love to take you to the two best breweries in the state for
that matter! I`d be a hoot and lots of fun. Heck I`ll even show you a
couple of roads that make the tail of the dragon look like a driveway!
--
Keith S
Just because a persons ideas are disagreable does not necessarily make
them disagreable.
Title: REPEAT AFTER ME
Date: Sun, 04 Oct 2009 23:34:19 +0000
Author: Ross Sharp
There is no debate …
AUSTRALIANS in general, and Queenslanders in particular, hold liberal views on abortion, yet politicians’ fear of small religious minorities appears to have stymied decriminalisation of the procedure in some states, a study shows.
The debate is over.
A clear majority of Australians – 57 per cent – support women’s right to obtain an abortion “readily when they want one”. One-third supports abortion “in special circumstances”, and only 4 per cent opposes abortion outright. The findings, from the Australian Election Study, are based on polling 1873 electors at the 2007 federal election. They reveal how Australians’ attitudes have become much more liberal since the same questions were put to voters 20 years earlier, when only 38 per cent agreed with women’s unfettered right to abortion.
More on: http://smellytongues.wordpress.com/2009/10/04/repeat-after-me/
Powered by Lv501.com