
Our German friends went to the polls this evening in what was variously described as a “yawner,” “soporific” and “one of the dullest in living memory” in which turnout reached a record low. How low is as yet unclear: there seem to have been about four million fewer votes cast this year (depending upon the number of outstanding ballots). That kind of drop should translate to a fall of 5-7 percent in terms of turnout, for a “lowest ever” result of around 70-72%.
(Yes kids. 70% is the lowest ever in Germany. Let this be a lesson that there are other – and I dare I hazard the sacrilege of saying better – ways of doing democracy.)
However I would submit that this has been a crucial poll for both Germany and the world. Suffice it to say that Germany remains, even now (especially now), the economic engine of Europe. Their unemployment is now below even our own – the benefit of a strong social safety net built at great cost during years of boom – and the first shoots of global recovery have appeared there. Along with France it essentially decides the direction of Europe, flail though Britain might (indeed, rightly or wrongly); it is a cornerstone of America’s Afghanistan policy, its European policy, its Iranian policy, its Russian policy… I run on. (And could.) But in short, this was an election of great significance to us – and not, indeed, just for foreign policy. What is happening in Germany is heading for us, too.
Background
On a basic level the political system is – was – dominated by two large parties and a number of smaller ones. The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) are centre-right – though the name falsely implies some commitment to clericalism, more prominent in their Bavarian branch than generally. They’re generally the party of rural areas, the country, and the south of Germany, especially Bavaria. The Social Democrats (SDP) are centre-left – the party of the unions, workers, cities, especially in the north. They have between them provided every Chancellor in modern German history.
In addition there are the Free Democrats (FDP, known colloquially as the ‘Liberals’), re-established along with the SDP and CDU/CSU at the refounding of the Republic. They’re just that: though what we would call relatively “progressive,” as with most modern classical liberals – sounds weird, especially as in America we term it “libertarian” – what the FDP really cares about is economics and driving government out of business. As such it’s slightly socially moderating to either the SDP or the CDU/CSU, but economically quite radical. Wealthier, college-educated urban Republicans would be quite at home here, and the FDP appeals to an educated, wealthy urban/suburban demographic.
Unlike other democracies (and totally unlike the US) Germany does not allow a leader to have less than the total support of Parliament, called Bundestag; that means no minority governments as in Canada. Throughout most of modern German history neither major party could gain a majority in parliament. This meant not only that the FDP always chose who governed, but assured that they were almost always in government. Though they were always the bridesmaid and never the bride, this made them relatively impervious to shifts in the electorate or their own vote totals. Vice-Chancellor Genscher thus served in that role for twenty years and was continuously in government for twenty-five years under three chancellors. Neither party cared much for them, but there was rarely a way around them.